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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
most that could be said was that the employer refused to arbi-
trate the issue and that this fact alone did not constitue a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)5 of the Labor Management Relations Act."
In the great majority of cases in which the grievance pro-
cedure reaches the arbitration stage both parties fulfill their
agreement to arbitrate. It is possible, however, that the very
absence of an adequate sanction to enforce arbitration will cause
harm to the arbitration process. In states which have passed or
will pass specific statutes allowing the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements in labor cases no real problem will arise. Assum-
ing the National Labor Relations Board follows the precedent set
in the Textron case, enforcement as an unfair labor practice
under Sections 8(a)5 or 8(b)3 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act seems not to be available as a method of enforcement.
Although a simple amendment of either the Labor Management
Relations Act or the Federal Arbitration Act could provide the
necessary remedy to enforce arbitration it is not likely that Con-
gress will pass such a statute in the near future. As was noted
above, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act has
been used successfully in some jurisdictions to enforce the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Thus, in the absence of a state statute, Section
301 provides the method which is most likely to meet with success
in the immediate future.
Maynard E. Cush
Visitation Rights of the Parent
Without Custody
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that upon separation or
divorce the custody of a minor child of the marriage is given to
one of the parents.' No provision in the legislation recognizes a
45. "Thus, the record establishes, at the most, that the Respondent
refused to comply with the Union's request that the Respondent submit to
arbitration the dispute arising out of that discharge. Whether or not such
refusal constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, it did not
in itself, constitute a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
Accordingly we shall dismiss the complaint." Id. at 2.
1. Art. 157, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1924, No. 74,
p. 114: "In all cases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed
under the care of the party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce
unless the judge shall, for the greater advantage of the children, order that
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right in the non-custodian parent to enjoy the company of the
child. Yet it may be assumed that there was never any intention
to give the custodian parent the power to deny completely to the
other the possibility of being with the child at least on occasions.
This would be particularly unjust if the custodian and not the
non-custodian parent is at fault in the divorce or separation. Thus
it may be said that here is a situation for which the legislation
should contain a provision, but in fact does not. The judiciary
has recognized this gap in the law and has attempted to formulate
a proper norm to regulate the problem. In so doing it has rejected
in principle a solution often adopted in other states, that of
divided custody. Indeed, such a solution in Louisiana would run
counter to the legislation giving custody to one parent. Instead,
the Supreme Court has come to recognize "a right of visitation"
in the non-custodian parent.
Although this problem must have existed from the time of
the enactment of the Civil Code of 1808, nothing could be found
in the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court dealing with it
as such before 1923. Hayden v. Hayden,2 decided in that year,
was an appeal from a district court judgment ordering the child
to be shifted to the other parent's custody every three months.
The Supreme Court annulled this divided custody judgment,
stating that under the Civil Code there was no provision other
than that granting the custody of a child to only one parent. If
the Supreme Court meant to recognize rights in the other parent
it did not mention this in its opinion.
Nine years later, however, in Jacquet v. Disimone,8 the
Supreme Court carefully elaborated a right of visitation in the
non-custodian parent, referring to this as a natural right flowing
from parentage which, like the fact of parentage itself, was not
negated by the provision of the Civil Code giving the custody of
the child to one of the parents. The district judge, evidently
some or all of them shall be entrusted to the care of the other party. The
party under whose care a child or children is placed, or to whose care a
child or children has been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or
tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the same effect
as if the other party had died."
Before 1921 in the case of divorce, the custodian parent also became the
tutor of the child, but in the case of separation the custodian, though entitled
to exclusive custody, did not become tutor. By La. Acts 1921(E.S.), No. 38,
p. 42, the custodian after divorce was denied tutorship and placed in the
same position as the custodian after a separation. By La. Acts 1924, No. 74,
p. 114, the custodian after separation or divorce becomes the natural tutor.
These changes did not, however, affect the subject under discussion.
2. 154 La. 716, 98 So. 162 (1923).
3. 175 L. 617, 143 So. 710 (1932).
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following the opinion in Hayden v. Hayden,4 had considered the
father without legal right to complain that the child's mother-
custodian had denied him all access to the child. In annulling
this judgment the Supreme Court used language which certainly
is justifiable under Article 21 of the Civil Code and which remains
the fundamental and clearest statement on the right of visitation:
"But the judgment of divorce did not have the effect of
divesting defendant of his fatherhood, and the child is still
his child, notwithstanding its custody was awarded to the
mother.
"A parent against whom an adverse judgment of divorce
has been rendered possesses certain natural rights with
respect to his child whose custody is given to the other parent.
One of these is the right of access to his child. And the exer-
cise of this right under such reasonable restrictions as the
circumstances warrant within the discretion of the court
should not be withheld, unless the parent has forfeited the
privilege by his conduct, or unless the exercise of the privi-
lege would injuriously affect the welfare of the child."'5
While the Supreme Court had anticipated the right of visita-
tion in Jacquet v. Disimone, it deliberately left the specification
of this right to the lower court and had not hinted what it might
consider a proper definition of that right even for the facts in
that specific case. This same procedure was followed in Shipp v.
Shipp,6 decided in 1935. In 1939, however, in Cormier v. Cormier,7
the Supreme Court, in accepting the district judge's opinion and
reproducing it as its own, necessarily put its stamp of approval
on the manner in which the district judge had specified the right
of visitation for the particular case. The order of the district
judge was that the father should be allowed to see the child once
a week at the mother's home on a day and hour agreeable to her,
and in addition, to take the child to his home on the last Saturday
of each month between the hours of 9 A.m. and 5 P.M. We must
assume the Supreme Court considered this specification reason-
able. Yet it must be remembered that the Supreme Court was
not itself giving specification to the right of visitation, but was
merely approving by implication the specification which had
been made by the district judge.
4. 154 La. 716, 98 So. 162 (1923).
5. 175 La. 617, 619, 143 So. 710, 711 (1932).
6. 183 La. 1025, 165 So. 189 (1935).
7. 193 La. 158, 190 So. 365 (1939).
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Another factor should be noted in connection with the
Cormier case. The district judge had proceeded to state what he
regarded as a minimum to satisfy the husband's right of visita-
tion even though he recognized expressly in his opinion that the
mother had not been arbitrary in this matter. Thus it may be
said that the Supreme Court in accepting the district judge's
opinion approved of the specification of visitation rights even in
the absence of a showing that the custodian parent had unreason-
ably denied or restricted the other parent's access to the child.
It was not until the decision in Pierce v. Pierces in 1948 that
the Supreme Court itself offered any indication of what it might
consider a proper arrangement in satisfaction of non-custodian's
right of visitation. The lower court had given the father posses-
sion of the child every weekend and during the months of
July and August. On appeal of the non-custodian parent, the
Supreme Court struck down the weekend custody arrangement
in this judgment on the theory that it amounted to a divided
custody award. At the same time, however, it refrained from
setting aside that portion of it giving the child to the non-
custodian parent during the summer months because it had not
been attacked. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court in annulling the
order for weekend custody had commented on how unwise this
would be for the child during the school year, it may be that the
court is willing to accept a divided custody arrangement if agreed
upon by the parties and the lower court, provided that in the
particular case the welfare of the child is not affected.
A similar indication seems to be contained in the opinion
rendered the following year in Johnson v. Johnson.9 There a
father sought a revision of a custody judgment rendered some
years before under which he had been given the right to visit his
child twice a month for two hours and forty minutes on each
occasion, alleging that since the child was older, he should be
permitted to see it more often. The lower court had refused to
revise its previous judgment but the Supreme Court, Justice
Hawthorne writing the opinion, indicated that the parent should
be allowed more frequent visits of a longer duration during the
school year and that the child should be allowed to visit the
parent from time to time during vacations. In this case, however,
Justice Hawthorne indicated that the lower court should specify
8. 213 La. 475, 35 So.2d 22 (1948).
9. 214 La. 912, 39 So.2d 340 (1949).
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the hours and times of visitation only if the parents could not
agree.
In Roshto v. Roshto,'* decided on the same day as the Johnson
case, the Supreme Court went so far as to state that a father
should be allowed to visit his child at least twice a month and
during periods of illness. In separate concurring opinions, Justices
Hawthorne and McCaleb took exception to this portion of the
majority opinion, both justices objecting that only the lower
court should affirmatively set the time of visitation; and Justice
McCaleb objecting to the blanket statement that the parent
should be permitted to visit his child during illness, on the theory
that the primary consideration should be the welfare of the child.
The above jurisprudence certainly indicates that a right of
visitation is recognized by the Supreme Court, and that, as speci-
fied, it must not in principle equal divided custody. Moreover, it
seems clear that except for what may be regarded as an uninten-
tional statement in the majority opinion of Roshto v. Roshto, the
Supreme Court will leave the actual specification of the hours and
times of the visits to the agreement of the parties or, in the
absence of an agreement, to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, striking a particular arrangement with nullity only if it
finds it contrary to the best interest of the child.
A further problem remains, however. Suppose the parent
who has been given custody desires to change his or her resi-
dence. Should the practical defeat of the other parent's right of
visitation be regarded as unavoidable, or should that parent have
the right to demand a redetermination of a custody and visitation
order? In Sanford v. Sanford," decided in 1945, a non-custodian
father had asked the court to redetermine the custody arrange-
ment after the custodian mother had remarried and moved out
of the state. The trial judge, finding that the father would never
be able to see the child if he were taken out of the state, while
the mother, on the contrary, would be able to visit the child
several times a year if he were to be placed in the custody of
the father, gave judgment accordingly. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the trial judge and left the former judgment
standing. Thus. whereas the trial judge had in fact provided for
the maximum possible respect for the rights of both parents, the
Supreme Court's judgment in effect negated the right of visita-
10. 214 La. 922, 39 So.2d 344 (1949).
11. 208 La. 1073, 24 So.2d 145 (1945).
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tion. Of course it is to be recognized there will always be situa-
tions where one of the parents may not be able to enjoy in fact
the visitation rights he would have if he and the custodian parent
lived in the same locality, but it would seem that the action taken
by the trial judge in the Sanford case was more consistent with
the actual interests involved in any custody problem when both
parents are living. In such instances there are actually three
interests, and not only one. There is, of. course, the welfare of
the child; but as long as this is not violated it would seem that
the custody and visitation order should be so designed as to
facilitate the maximum contact of both parents with the child.
It is submitted that it is the recognition of these three interests
that prompted the decision in the recent United States Supreme
Court case of May v. Anderson,12 under which a custody judg-
ment is not entitled to full faith and credit when opposed by a
parent who was not before the court which rendered it.'8
John M. Shaw
Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in
Louisiana Criminal Cases'
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
"Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided
in this Code." 2 No definition of hearsay evidence is given, nor is
there a setting out of the exceptions. As a consequence, one who
would understand the nature of hearsay evidence in Louisiana
criminal jurisprudence must glean his rules and definitions from
12. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
13. This paper does not go into the question of whether a custodian par-
ent who is also natural tutor under Civil Code Articles 157 and 246 may
remove his child and domicile beyond the limits of the state without seeking
permission of the court which rendered the custody judgment. This matter
was considered in the case of Wilmot v. Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321
(1953), and there it seems to have been assumed that such permission would
be required. A good discussion of that case is contained in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Tutorship and Custody, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 127 (1953).
1. Civil cases are not discussed because the exclusionary rules of
evidence as used in civil matters most often go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence.
2. LA. R.S. § 15:434 (1950).
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